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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stripped to its essentials, the State's Brief advocates a funda-
mental injustice in this capital case. The State admits William 
Andrews did not kill any of the victims of this crime •— despite the 
contrary suggestions at trial. The State does not contest that 
Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness at trial taints the record here on the 
critical issue of the degree of Mr. Andrews1 participation in the 
crimes. The State virtually concedes a lesser included offense 
instruction should have been given to the jury that convicted William 
Andrews. The State does not dispute the affidavits of William 
Andrews' lawyers that the failure to earlier raise the issue of 
failure to instruct on lesser included offenses, was not the result of 
any tactical decision on their part — or Mr. Andrews' own affidavit 
that he was never told anything about this question. The State does 
not deny that the failure to give a warranted lesser included offense 
instruction in a capital case is prejudicial and injects a level of 
unreliability into the decision to impose the death penalty, 
unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment. Yet the State urges this 
Court to uphold William Andrews' sentence of death, solely because his 
court-appointed and volunteer lawyers — like the prosecutors and 
courts of the time — did not anticipate the line of state and federal 
cases on which the issue here rests, years before it emerged. 
With life at stake, this Court should not allow itself to be made 
a party to such unprincipled maneuverings. 
II. RESTATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner's Brief documented critical omissions by trial counsel 
which if pursued, would have presented to the jury a view of 
Mr. Andrews1 participation which was much more favorable to his 
defense. (Pet. Brief, pp. 6-10; 12; 14-18; 29-34, 36). 
The State's Statement of Facts attempts to blur distinctions in 
the trial evidence between the acts of Mr. Pierre and those of 
Mr. Andrews. Moreover, the State's presentation overstates the trial 
evidence of Mr. Andrews' participation. This hyperbole could seri-
ously mislead the Court. We treat here the more serious examples. 
Assertion; "As he [Orren] approached the basement stairway, 
Andrews and Pierre confronted him with guns and forced him down the 
stairs. Pierre's gun discharged twice, startling Andrews (who was 
standing in front of Pierre at the time) and prompting him to say, 
'What did you do that for, man?' (3071-72)." Brief, p. 5. There was 
no testimony that Orren was "forced" down the stairs by Mr. Andrews. 
Orren testified at 3069, "the man at the top of the stairs [Pierre] 
waved the gun, his gun to indicate for me to go down the stairs," and 
at 3070 that "[Andrews] was holding his gun on me at the bottom of the 
stairs." 
Assertion: "When Orren refused to administer the caustic sub-
stance, Andrews placed a gun at his head and threatened him by saying, 
'Man, there is a gun at your head!' (3078)." Brief, p. 6. At p. 3078 
Orren testified that Mr. Andrews was standing "approximately maybe 
four feet from me" and that "he had his gun in his hand. I am sure he 
had it aimed at my head." There was no testimony that Mr. Andrews 
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"placed" the gun at his head. Mr. Andrews did nothing when Mr. Walker 
refused to administer the liquid. 
Assertion; "Pierre captured her [Carol] at gunpoint upstairs 
while Andrews guarded the other victims." (No citation). Brief, 
p. 6. At p. 3082 Orren testified simply that Mr. Andrews was "at the 
bottom of the steps" when Carol came in. 
Assertion: " . . . Andrews continued to pour . . . (3084-87, 
3128, 3182)." Brief, p. 6. Orren testified that Mr. Andrews poured 
each of the doses of Drano, but at 3182-83, on cross-examination, he 
admitted that he only saw Mr. Andrews pour the liquid in the cup the 
first time and "wasn't really observing Mr* Andrews after that point." 
Assertion: "At no time did Andrews display any fear over pouring 
the Drano, and at no time did either assailant threaten the other if 
he did not administer the substance (3208, 3211)." Although these 
record references are correct, the testimony was in response to lead-
ing questions to which Mr. Caine did not object. They also ignore 
Orren1s testimony at 3183-84: 
Q: So at some point concerning the adminis-
tration of the liquid this statement ["I 
can't do it, I am scared"] was also 
said? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: That you are clear about? 
A: Nodding his head up and down.1 
1
 Mr. Walker's testimony at the preliminary hearing made it clear 
that Mr. Andrews made this statement just before Mr. Pierre began 
administering the liquid. See Pet. Br. at p. 7. 
The State also asserts that "Both assailants then covered three 
of the victims1 mouths with tape" Brief, p. 7. Yet at the preliminary 
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Assertion; "Orren heard mumbled conversation between the assail-
ants, but could only discern Andrews saying, fI can't do it, I am 
scared,1 and later Pierre's reply to Andrews of 'about 30 minutes.' 
(3092-93, 3095, 3187)." Brief, p. 8. The sequence of events is not 
clear from the cited testimony. Orren testified at 3094-95 that 
Mr. Pierre took his watch and wallet just before Mr. Pierre said 
"about 30 minutes." There is no indication that Mr. Pierre's comment 
was in "reply" to Mr. Andrews saying "I can't do it, I am scared." 
Mr. Andrews left the scene right after Mr. Pierre said "about 30 
minutes" (3095-96) and was not seen again by Orren. 
HI- ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
The State spends more than sixty pages of its brief setting forth 
the facts and arguing that this Court, unlike the court below, should 
refuse to address the merits of the petition and instead, dismiss it 
as procedurally barred or as an abuse of the writ. 
The State also seeks to avoid the full impact of Mr. Caine's 
ineffectiveness by ignoring the evidence which was available at trial 
but not utilized by him to differentiate the level of Mr. Andrews' 
participation from that of Mr. Pierre. The State does not argue that 
these omissions did not demonstrate ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 
(Footnote Continued) 
hearing Mr. Walker's testimony was that Mr. Pierre taped his mouth, 
and that he could not see who else was taped or who did the taping. 
PH Tr. 32-39, 
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The State does not even attempt to argue that these glaring omissions 
were reasoned decisions in furtherance of a "trial strategy," No con-
ceivable trial strategy would have wasted the opportunity to bring out 
to the jury that: 
1. Mr. Andrews did not continue to pour the liquid as 
Mr. Pierre administered it. He refused, saying, "I can't do 
it, Ifm scared." Pet. Brief, p. 7. 
2. Mr. Andrews did not participate in taping the mouth of any 
victim. J[cL at p. 8. 
3. Mr. Pierre's taping of the victims' mouths occurred 30-40 
minutes after the liquid had been administered, and was not 
for the purpose of keeping the liquid in, but rather to keep 
the victims silent. Id. at pp. 9-10. 
4. Whatever it was that Mr. Pierre wanted Mr. Andrews to do 
around 9:00 p.m. that evening, Mr. Andrews refused to do, 
again saying, "I can't do it, I'm scared." He left the 
store within minutes, and was not seen or heard again by 
Mr. Walker. X_d. at p. 9. 
The State does not even attempt to deny the prejudicial effect of 
these omitted points. The omitted evidence strongly supported 
Mr. Andrews' defense that he did not intend that killing take place; 
he actively refused to take part in the administration of the liquid 
and in the subsequent killings. The trial evidence that the jury did 
hear thus exaggerated or misstated Mr. Andrews' participation in the 
critical events which every reviewing court, including this Court, 
used to satisfy itself that the evidence of Mr. Andrews' guilt of 
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first degree murder was overwhelming. Clearly this "evidence" was 
tainted by Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness. 
All of these omissions are directly relevant to the substantive 
issue presented by the petition, Mr. Andrews1 entitlement to a jury 
instruction on second degree felony murder. 
The State spends only five pages addressing the merits of this 
issue. We begin our reply by addressing those arguments. 
B. The Evidence Supported a Second Degree 
Felony Murder Instruction. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, there is no requirement that 
the evidence in support of the lesser included offense instruction be 
"compelling" (Brief, pp. 61-62); rather the issue is simply whether 
the evidence "provide(d) a rationale basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense."2 
The State's assertion that Judge Young's "denial of relief should 
be affirmed on the ground that the absence of the instruction did not 
result in a constitutional violation, "(Brief, p. 63) would directly 
contravene the holding of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and 
this Court's decision in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984). 
Even the record which overstated Mr. Andrews' participation 
clearly supported an interpretation that Mr. Andrews did not intend 
that any killing take place. That is all that was required to entitle 
him to the instruction. The contrary conclusion reached by the 
district court is unsupported in the evidence and error. 
2
 State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 at 424, quoting from State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152 at 159. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4). 
C. The Failure to Give the Instruction Violated 
Mr, Andrews1 Rights Under the Eighth Amendment, 
The State concedes that since Beck v, Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 
(1980)f in capital cases the failure to give lesser included offense 
instructions violates the defendant's constitutional rights, where the 
evidence would support the instruction. See Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 
F.2d 597, 601 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 296 (1987). 
The State seeks to avoid the Beck decision by arguing that the 
failure to ask for the felony murder instruction and the failure to 
object to the absence of the instruction did not constitute ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel because it was part of an "all or nothing" 
trial strategy. (Brief, pp. 63-64). 
We are puzzled by this assertion, as it directly contradicts the 
State's concession, buried in footnote 36: 
"Because the State has no reason to doubt the tes-
timony of petitioner's counsel in their affidavits 
concerning a deliberate withholding of the issues 
the State does not assert that prong of the abuse 
of the writ doctrine as a basis for dismissal of 
the petition." Brief, p. 40. 
Regardless of whether the State concedes the point, the record below 
is uncontroverted. Mr. Cainefs affidavit states in pertinent part: 
"In connection with Mr. Andrews' defense, I took 
exception to the trial court's refusal to instruct 
the jury of the lesser included offense of second 
degree murder. I did not make any tactical deci-
sion to withhold the lesser included offense of 
second degree murder from the jury, and affirma-
tively objected to the court's refusal to submit 
that lesser included offense. My arguments to the 
jury did not discuss the alternative of second 
degree murder because the jury was not instructed 
on that alternative." Add. at pp. 12-13. 
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The foregoing statement clearly shows that Mr. Caine, rather than 
choosing to take an all or nothing approach, was forced to do so by 
the court's ruling. Such a response does not constitute "an objec-
tively justifiable trial strategy" (Brief, p. 63) but rather an 
attempt to make the best out of a bad situation. Mr. Caine1s joining 
in the exceptions to the failure to give the lesser included offense 
instructions which were proferred is also totally inconsistent with 
the State's belated theory of an all or nothing trial strategy. It 
similarly distinguishes this case from the "all or nothing" cases 
cited by the State.3 
The State argues unconvincingly that the lesser included offense 
instructions which were tendered in behalf of Mr. Pierre, and as to 
which Mr. Caine did object to the court's refusal, should be ignored 
because these instructions were inconsistent with the defense theme 
that no death was intended by Mr. Andrews. (Brief, p. 64). That 
assertion is only partially true as to Mr. Pierre's proposed instruc-
tion No. 3, and completely untrue as to proposed instructions 4 though 
12. See State Add., Appendix B. The trial court's refusal of these 
instructions clearly violated Mr. Andrews' Eighth Amendment rights 
under Beck. 
We turn then to the issue of Beck's application to the felony 
murder instruction, where it was supported by the evidence but not 
requested by Mr. Caine nor given sua sponte by the trial judge. 
3
 ILa., State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1977); Maynor v. Green, 
547 F.Supp. 264 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Aldrich v. Wainwriqht, 777 F.2d 630 
(11th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 324 (1986); Rawlins v. 
Craven, 329 F.Supp. 40 (CD. Calif. 1971); Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d 
588 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966); State v. Mitchell, 
278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955). 
D. Beck Requires that the Trial Court 
Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses 
Regardless of Whether Requested. 
This Court has long recognized that the failure to give a war-
ranted lesser included offense instruction, even though not requested 
by the defendant, can be reversible error. State v. Cobo, 60 Pe2d 
952, 958 (Utah 1936); State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 
1955); State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 145 (Utah 1983); State v. Close, 
499 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Utah 1972). This should be particularly true in 
capital cases, where this Court has traditionally gone to great 
lengths, including sua sponte review, to protect the rights of those 
facing the death penalty. State v. Standrod, 547 P.2d 215 (Utah 
1976); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 
1345, 1353 (Utah 1977); State v. Stenback, 2 P.2d 105 (Utah 1931); 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53 (Utah 1987). 
In applying Beck the Ninth Circuit has held that it was constitu-
tional error for the trial court to fail to give a lesser included 
offense instruction, even where not requested by the defendant * 
Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1986)f cert. 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 928 (1987). In reaching this result the court 
rejected the argument which the State advances here, namely that the 
evidence in support of the instruction must be "compelling." (Brief, 
p. 62). .Id. at 373. Creation here of a standard of compelling evi-
dence would contravene both U.C.A. § 76-1-402(4), and this Court's 
long standing precedents as to the quality of the evidence required.1* 
4
 The Tenth Circuit has adopted a compelling standard to the review 
of failures to give lesser included offenses in non-capital cases, but 
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The State also urges that the evidence in support of the second 
degree felony murder instruction would have to be compelling before 
Mr. Caine could be held to be ineffective for failing to request it 
(Brief, pp. 61-62). That would hardly be a proper test here, where it 
is obvious that the instruction best fit the theory of the defense, 
and Mr. Caine was well aware of the trial evidence in support of 
unintentional killing, in fact arguing it to the jury. 
E. Mr. Caine1s General Ineffectiveness at Trial and 
on Appeal Were at Issue in the District Court and 
are Properly Before this Court. 
The State urges that the required showing of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel is at least the same for generally overturning a con-
viction as it is for excusing procedural default or abuse of the writ 
(Brief, pp. 42, 46-51). If this is so, then petitioner should be 
afforded the same latitude in proving the general ineffectiveness of 
his counsel and the resulting prejudice in either case. 
However here the State seeks to artificially limit the issue of 
ineffectiveness to the single question of failure to advocate the giv-
ing of an instruction on second degree felony murder. This test would 
preclude the full review of the record which the Court prefers in 
making the determinations of whether counsel was in fact ineffective 
and whether the ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice.5 
(Footnote Continued) 
adheres to the normal standard under Beck in capital cases. Trui illo 
v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d at 601, 603: "Thus there is clearly now a con-
stitutional right to a lesser included offense instruction when the 
death penalty is imposed and the evidence warrants the instruction." 
Ld. at 601. 
5
 State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1206 (Utah 1984); State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
The State seeks to impose this unfavored limitation by asserting 
that ineffectiveness as to the failure regarding the felony murder 
instruction was the only ineffectiveness urged in the petition and in 
the proceedings before the district court (Brief at pp. 23-24; 51-52). 
Yet in the district court Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Oppo-
sition to Motion to Dismiss relied as well upon Mr. Caine's general 
ineffectiveness both at trial6 and on appeal.7 
The affidavits of Messrs. Hill (Add. at 14-16) and Athay (Add. at 
17-19) clearly raise questions about Mr. Caine's general ineffec-
tiveness which go beyond the single issue surrounding the lesser 
included offense instruction. This evidence came in without objection 
from the State. Nor did the State seek to limit the more general 
assertions as to Mr. Caine's overall effectiveness which were argued 
at the hearing below. 
Finally, it is clear that the district court here considered and 
ruled on the broader issue of ineffectiveness (Mem. Decision, pp. 2-3; 
4)f and ruled on the adequacy of the evidence in support of the more 
general assertion. Judge Young considered the petition in light of 
the evidence before him.8 
6
 " . . . [T]he cause for that [procedural default] lies in 
Mr. Caine's inexperience and his inability to render effective assis-
tance in a capital trial of this complexity . . . " p. 9. 
7
 "On appeal Mr. Caine clearly did an ineffective job in repre-
senting Mr. Andrews. . . . Mr. Caine's failure to clearly raise the 
second degree murder issue was a result of that ineffectiveness. 
. . . The seven-page brief filed by Mr. Caine clearly fell below pre-
vailing professional norms for representation of clients in capital 
cases in the State of Utah." pe 10. 
8
 See H.C. Tr., pp. 5-9; 11-12; 19-20; 22-23; 31; 33-35. 
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The State argues that Mr. Cainefs affidavit and his conduct in 
joining in the lesser included offenses instruction exception at trial 
should be ignored. According to the State, if there is a hypothetical 
"objectively justifiable trial strategy" (Brief, p. 50, n. 39; p. 63) 
any factual inquiry is foreclosed over whether that was in fact the 
trial strategy employed or whether counsel was in fact ineffective. 
If that were the case, then the numerous cases which reflect evidenti-
ary hearings regarding ineffectiveness, where the issue of trial 
strategy is fully explored, would simply reflect needless judicial 
inquiry.9 Of course the trial record itself may provide the answer, 
clearly showing a deliberate withholding and/or an "all or nothing" 
trial strategy.10 But that is not this case. 
F. Abuse of the Writ Does Not Apply 
To This Successor Petition. 
The State argues that this petition should be barred as abusive 
because the issue raised here based upon Beck should or could have 
been raised in November, 1978, when the first State petition was 
filed. Since Beck was decided on June 20, 1980, some twenty months 
after the first petition was filed, the State is reduced to arguing 
that counsel should have been able to foresee the result in Beck based 
9
 Aldrich v. Wainwriqht, 777 F.2d 630 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 324 (1986); Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1508-10 
(10th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501f 
1513 (10th Cir. 1987); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). 
10
 Maynor v. Green, 547 F. Supp 264 (S.D. Ga. 1982); State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59-60 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)(cautionary instruction on 
photo identification required). 
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upon the state of the case law in November, 1978. The State thus 
argues that Beck was not novel, and hence no "good cause" is shown for 
failing to raise it in the prior State petition. The court below gave 
no rationale for its conclusion that "the defendant could or should 
have raised the issues contained in this present Petition either on 
appeal, or in prior post-conviction relief . . . ." Mem. Decision, 
p. 3 (Add. p. 3). 
The State, in supposedly addressing the issue of abuse of the 
writ, goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate that the concept of 
felony murder has long been recognized in Utah, as has the doctrine 
that failure to instruct on a warranted lesser included offense is 
reversible error. (Brief, pp. 29-33). Those facts are irrelevant to 
the issue of failure to raise the Beck issue in the first State peti-
tion, for mere errors are not cognizable under Rule 65B(i); only con-
stitutional issues could be raised in the first petition. 
The State also interjects ineffectiveness of counsel into its 
abuse of the writ discussion. (Brief, pp. 40-52). It argues that 
there is no right to effective counsel in post-conviction proceedings 
(Brief, pp. 41-42).ll That is entirely inappropriate, as it is not 
petitioner's position that there were defects in the first petition 
that were due to ineffective counsel, or that the failure to raise the 
11
 While there may not be any Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings, the Fourth Circuit, in a recent en banc 
opinion, has recognized a right to counsel in State post-conviction 
proceedings based upon the death-sentenced petitioner's right to 
access to the courts pursuant to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
Giarrantano v. Murray, No. 87-7518 and 87-7519 (4th Cir. June 3, 
1988). The State had cited the original panel decision, 836 F.2d 1421 
(4th Cir. 1988) which has now been reversed. Brief, p. 42. 
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Beck issue there constituted ineffective assistance. Given 
Mr. Caine's inexperience and the time constraints faced by Mr. Ford 
when he entered the case,12 it is disingenuous for the State to argue 
that counsel could have fashioned a Beck issue. 
The "good cause" for not raising Beck in the first petition is 
Beck's novelty and unavailability. That unavailability excuses both 
Mr. Caine and Mr. Ford, and thus the State's point that petitioner 
does not claim that Mr. Ford was ineffective is a nullity (Brief, pp. 
40, fn. 37; 51). Mr. Ford, of course did not participate as counsel 
at either the trial or the direct appeal. 
Similarly the State's contention that the standard for finding 
ineffective assistance that excuses abuse of the writ should be more 
difficult than the ineffectiveness standards of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(Brief, pp. 42-46), is simply inappli-
cable to petitioner's showing of good cause under Rule 65B(i)(4).13 
We turn then to the State's contention that Beck was not novel. 
12
 Mr. Ford entered the case at a time when Mr. Andrews' execution 
was imminent; he had to rely entirely on Mr. Caine; the first petition 
was dismissed by the trial court two days after it was filed. See 
Ford Affidavit, Add. at 9-10. The time factor was an "objective 
factor external to the defense . . .," Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478, 488 (1986). 
13
 The only authority for this proposition is Judge Tjoflat's dis-
senting opinion in Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. 
granted, 108 S.Ct. 1467 (1988). This Court's application of 
Strickland has not demonstrated any indication that the current stan-
dard is too lax. See cases cited at fn. 5, supra, p. 10. 
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1. The Beck Decision was Unforeseeable 
at the Time of Petitioner's First 
State Habeas Corpus Petition, 
In response to petitioner's argument that Beck was a novel devel-
opment in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence the State asserts that there 
existed federal and state case law which "strongly suggested the due 
process issue (as either a federal or state constitutional mat-
ter) . . . ." Brief at 34. This argument is flawed for two reasons: 
(1) there, in factf had been no holding by any court that raised the 
failure to give a lesser included offense instruction in a capital 
case to the level of a constitutional violation, (the idea had been 
rejected on numerous occasions) nor were the cases leading up to Beck 
a clear harbinger of Beck's final holding; (2) the State equates the 
law of due process with the law of the Eighth Amendment when, in fact, 
the two theories are entirely independent and distinct. 
a. Until Beck, the Failure to Instruct on a Lesser 
Included Offense Did Not Present a Constitutional Claim. 
In order to seek relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65(i) a petitioner 
must allege that "in [the] proceedings which resulted in his commit-
ment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitu-
tion of the United States or of the State of Utah or both." It is 
clear that at the time of petitioner's first post-conviction relief 
petition neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah had been held to require instructing the 
jury on a lesser included offense in a capital case. Indeed, as late 
as January, 1980, a mere six months before the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Beck, the Fifth Circuit held that the failure to give a lesser 
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included offense instruction did not raise a federal constitutional 
issue. Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980). Numerous 
federal decisions had similarly held that failure to give a lesser 
included offense instruction presented no federal constitutional 
issue: Kreilinq v. Field, 431 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1970); Poulson v. 
Turner, supra, n. 3; DeBerrv v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Rawlins v. Craven, 329 F.Supp. 40 (CD. Calif. 1971); Grech v. 
Wainwriqht, 492 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1974); Alliqood v. Wainwriqht, 440 
F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1971); Hiqqins v. Wainwriqht, 424 F.2d 177 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 905 (1970); Flagler v. Wainwriqht, 423 
F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970); Bonner v. 
Henderson, 517 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1975). The State points to no case 
prior to the 1980 Beck decision in which the failure to give a lesser 
included offense instruction was held to offend the Eighth Amendment. 
That the Fifth Circuit, two years after petitioner's first state 
post-conviction relief petition, failed to see a constitutional issue 
under facts similar to the case here, shows that the law was not clear 
in 1978. It would have required clairvoyant counsel to fashion a Beck 
issue.11* Clairvoyance is not the standard of "availability." 
In arguing that Beck was easily predictable, the State relies 
heavily on Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973). Keeble, and 
the other cases cited by the State in support of this argument (Joe v. 
iif
 The Supreme Court itself remarked about the lack of clarity in 
its recent Eighth Amendment decisions: "The signals from this Court 
have not, however, always been easy to decipher." Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586 at 602 (1978); see also. Id. at 599, as to the "confusion 
as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord 
with the Eighth Amendment." 
-16-
United States, 510 F.2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1974) and United States v. 
Antelope, 523 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1975), reversed on other grounds, 430 
U.S. 641 (1977)) are all cases involving American Indians prosecuted 
under the Major Crimes Act. All three decisions specifically declined 
to reach any constitutional issue and decided the issues before them 
as a matter of statutory construction. A common theme running through 
the three cases is a concern for the integrity of tribal jurisdiction 
balanced against the need to provide Indians with the same type and 
quality of procedural protection as was enjoyed by non-Indians charged 
with the same crimes. Keeble, 412 U.S. at 213; Joe, 510 F.2d at 
1040; Antelope, 523 F.2d at 402 et. seg. 
To deny Indian defendants the same protection afforded non-Indian 
defendants solely because of their ethnic origin would raise constitu-
tional questions, but the constitutional problem would be one of equal 
protection, not some violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Antelope 
the court is primarily concerned with equal protection issues and 
nowhere even mentions the Eighth Amendment. The footnote identified 
by the State as evidence that the Antelope court viewed Keeble as 
defining a constitutional right to a lesser included offense instruc-
tion (Brief at 36) in fact is limited to Indian defendants charged 
under the Major Crimes Act. An Indian's "constitutionally guaranteed" 
right to such an instruction can be seen as an outgrowth of their 
right to equal protection of the law in a setting where the enumerated 
offenses of the controlling statute would have treated them differ-
ently solely for constitutionally impermissible reasons. Keeble, 
Antelope and Joe do not stand for the proposition that the common law 
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of the states in which the crimes occurred would be constitutionally 
deficient if provision were not made for a lesser included offense 
instruction. 
In Beck, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the law up to that 
time had recognized that a lesser included offense instruction can "be 
beneficial to the defendant," Beck, 447 U.S. at 633, and quoted its 
decision in Keeble to the effect that "we have never explicitly held 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the 
right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included 
offense . . . ." Id. at 634. Thus, until Becjc, the right to a 
lesser included offense instruction, while "beneficial" to a defen-
dant, had not yet reached the level of a right of constitutional 
dimension. 
The State argues that because Beck relied in part on three cases 
decided in 1976 dealing with state sentencing schemes in capital cases 
(Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) the peti-
tioner here should have been able to construct a Beck-type argument in 
his first State petition. (Brief at n. 34). Those cases, however, 
arose in legal settings significantly different from the question 
presented here and cannot be read as clear precursors of Beck. They 
are too legally remote from the Beck decision to have served as the 
basis for the argument petitioner advances here. Woodson dealt solely 
with procedures at the sentencing phase and did not consider a lesser 
included offense issue; Roberts struck down a procedure requiring 
instructions on lesser included offenses even if unwarranted by the 
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evidence, and Gregg merely held that giving such an instruction would 
not violate the Constitution. None of these cases are clear enough 
signposts to alert counsel that Beck was on the horizon. 
2. Due Process Precedent Does Not Accurately 
Predict Eighth Amendment Law. _ _ 
In response to petitioner's argument that his confinement is in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment the State points to federal and 
state cases which it contends suggest the due process issue raised by 
petitioner. Brief at 34. This argument fails to recognize the dif-
ference between due process precedent and precedent supporting Eighth 
Amendment claims. "It is clear that not every claim that implicates 
the fundamental fairness standards embodied in the due process clause 
necessarily implicates the Eighth Amendment as well." Adams v. 
Dugger, 816 F,2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987) at n.2, cert, granted, 108 
S.Ct. 1106 (1988). The two doctrines are distinct and comprise dif-
ferent aspects of Constitutional theory. "The distinction between 
claims that implicate the fundamental fairness standards embodied in 
the due process clause and those that implicate the Eighth Amendment 
has been recognized from the inception of the Supreme Court's modern 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." Ibid. A comparison of McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) points up this distinction. In McGautha, the Supreme Court had 
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
violated by standardless jury discretion procedures or a unified guilt 
and sentencing process. Ld. at 196-203 and 213-217. One year later, 
in Furman, the Court held that these same features of Georgia's 
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capital sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. The due pro-
cess precedent of McGautha was an inaccurate predictor of the Eighth 
Amendment law later announced in Furman. The State concedes that 
Keeble and the Utah cases it cites do not directly suggest an Eighth 
Amendment violation but concludes that this distinction is not criti-
cal. Brief at n.34. The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, however, is to the contrary. 
3. No Utah Decision Recognized a 
Constitutional Issue. 
With regard to a claim made under the Utah Constitution, the 
State points to State v. Gillian, 463 P.2d 811 (Utah 1970) in which 
this Court reversed on direct appeal a conviction of first degree 
murder because the jury was not instructed on the defendant's theory 
of the case, where there was evidence to justify such an instruction. 
Nowhere in Gillian, however, does this Court refer to the failure to 
give a lesser included offense instruction as a constitutional viola-
tion of any kind. The State cites a number of other Utah cases (Brief 
at 38), but none of them give any indication of a violation of the 
federal or Utah Constitution, either based upon due process or any 
other concept. In fact, it would be six years after Mr. Andrews1 
first State petition before this Court in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 
551 (Utah 1984) would come to that conclusion. 
This Court should reject the contention that in 1978 reasonably 
competent counsel could have foreseen Beck, and hold that Beck's 
novelty and unavailability is good cause under Rule 65B(i)(4) for not 
raising the issue in the prior petition. 
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G. Any Procedural Default at Trial or on Direct 
Appeal is Cured by the Ample Demonstration 
of Cause and Prejudice Here. 
The issue as to procedural default here is whether, because coun-
sel for petitioner at trial failed to request a second degree felony 
murder instruction, and failed to object to the absence of one,15 and 
failed to raise that issue on direct appeal, as well as failed to 
raise the refusal of the lesser included offense instructions that 
were requested, petitioner is barred from raising these issues in this 
petition. 
The State agrees that such procedural bars can be avoided by a 
showing of cause for the prior failure and a demonstration of result-
ing prejudice. Brief, n. 38. 
1. There is Cause and Prejudice to Excuse Any Default. 
The first cause of the default is that at trial and on direct 
appeal petitioner's counsel was ineffective. The fact of his ineffec-
tiveness has been demonstrated in petitioner's opening brief, pp. 
6-10; 12; 14-15; 16-18; 29-34; 36. T'he State nowhere really contests 
Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness, but rather attempts to excuse it as 
"trial strategy." We have dealt with that contention elsewhere in 
this brief. (supra, pp. 7-8) We add that no alleged "trial strategy" 
would excuse Mr. Caine's failures to raise these issues on direct 
appeal. 
The prejudice caused by this ineffectiveness is apparent: 
Mr. Andrews stands sentenced to death under a constitutionally-suspect 
State v. Close, 499 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Utah 1972). 
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conviction. The rationale of Beck provides all the prejudice neces-
sary, for it requires that the jury be given the "third option" of the 
lesser included offense. Here that option was denied Mr. Andrews 
because of Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness at the trial and on direct 
appeal. Here there was a "reasonable probability" that but for coun-
sel's ineffectiveness the result here would have been different. 
State v. Lairbyf 699 P.2d 1187, 1205 (Utah 1984). 
Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness included not knowing what the Utah 
law was on second degree felony murder under the new 1973 statute. 
Mr. Caine, according to Mr. Ford's affidavit, thought that second 
degree felony murder was not covered by the new statute. Ford Affida-
vit, pp. 2-3.l6 Not knowing what a client's rights are is of course 
within the ambit of ineffective assistance. State v. McNicol, 554 
P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th 
Cir. 1979). An "uninformed error" can constitute ineffective assis-
tance. Maynor v. Green, 547 F.Supp. 264, 268 (S.D. Ga. 1982). So too 
can the failure to raise on direct appeal, an issue which will secure 
reversal. People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 305 (111. 
1986)(dissenting opinion), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 210 (1987); 
Mr. Ford states: 
I do recall at one time asking Mr. Andrews' origi-
nal counsel, John Caine, whether he had considered 
raising an issue regarding the trial court's 
failure to instruct on second degree felony 
murder, sometime after the original petition was 
dismissed by this [trial] court. He told me that 
section of the Utah Code was not enacted at the 
trial of this case. 
Add., p. 10-11. 
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Robison v. Maynardy 829 F.2d 1501, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1987); Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496-97. 
But for the presence of State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 
1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), we could simply rely on 
ineffectiveness of counsel without considering the issue of novelty. 
But Norton is troubling because it held that second degree felony 
murder was not available as a lesser included offense where as here 
the robbery victim was killed. Norton was this Court's first decision 
construing the new second degree felony murder provisions of the 1973 
statute. Contrary to the State's implied assertion (Brief, pp. 30-32) 
Utah had no well developed case law on second degree felony murder.17 
This fact poses the vexing issue: If Mr. Caine had preserved and 
raised the second degree felony murder issue in the direct appeal, 
would he have lost because he got the Norton decision,18 or won a 
reversal because he got the Hansen decision? If it was the former 
result, petitioner is protected by unavailability, if the latter, by 
ineffectiveness. Certainly petitioner cannot lose on both theories. 
17
 Under the old statute it appears that if a killing occurred in 
the course of certain enumerated felonies, it was first degree murder, 
regardless of the defendant's intent. Only if the murder took place 
in the course of an unenumerated felony was second degree felony 
murder available. State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246 (Utah 1970). For this 
reason the issue of second degree felony murder as a lesser included 
offense of first degree murder rarely came up under the old statute. 
The other two cases cited by the State (Brief, p. 31), State v. 
Condit, 125 P.2d 801 (Utah 1942) and State v. Thome, 117 Pac. 58 
(Utah 1911) did not involve a "lesser included offense" -- in both, 
felony murder was first degree murder. 
18
 It is interesting to note that the State urges here that Norton 
should be ignored because its error was so apparent. (Brief, 
pp. 31-32), yet in Hansen the State was strenuously arguing jln. favor 
of Norton; Hansen, 734 P.2d at 425-26. 
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Mr. Cainefs clearly ineffective assistance at trial and on direct 
appeal constitutes cause for any procedural default. Under Beck the 
prejudice is that Mr. Andrews has been sentenced to death based upon a 
constitutionally unreliable verdict of first degree murder. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The merit of Mr. Andrews1 constitutional claim is clear. Neither 
abuse of the writ nor procedural default bars the claim. 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the 
case remanded to the district court to vacate petitioner's sentence of 
death and/or his conviction of first degree murder, or to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve any disputed factual issues revealed by 
these proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this
 J£^vday of August, 1988. 
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